Write an article about Israel’s war of grand ambition .Organize the content with appropriate headings and subheadings (h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6), Retain any existing tags from
The rapidly escalating military conflict between Israel and Iran represents a clash of ambitions. Iran seeks to become a nuclear power, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu longs to be remembered as the Israeli leader who categorically thwarted Iran’s nuclear programme, which he views as an existential threat to Israel’s survival. Both dreams are as misguided as they are dangerous.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions have always been driven primarily by the goal of securing the regime’s survival, not annihilating Israel, which is far more likely to be destroyed at the end of a long war of attrition than under a mushroom cloud.
But Israel cannot afford to treat Iran’s threats of nuclear Armageddon as mere bloviating, particularly after Hamas’s Oct 7, 2023 terrorist attack, which triggered Israel’s long, brutal, and ongoing offensive against the Iranian proxy in Gaza. It is not wrong to fear a nuclear Iran.
But Netanyahu is a key reason why Iran’s nuclear programme is as far along as it is. It was over his objections that the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US), together with the European Union, negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, freezing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme.
And it was under pressure from Netanyahu that Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA three years later, spurring Iran to renew its race for the bomb.
Israel’s audacious attacks on Iran surely will cause further tension between Trump and Netanyahu. Since his return to the White House, Trump has sought a new nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic. But this was never going to be an easy process – and not only because Iran has little reason to trust the US.
While Trump has no qualms about touting unimpressive (or worse) deals as historic breakthroughs, he surely feels pressure to strike an agreement that is somehow better than the JCPOA that then-US president Barack Obama negotiated a decade ago.
Given this, Trump probably views Israel’s strikes as useful in limited doses – just enough to increase his leverage in the nuclear negotiations that were already under way. But Netanyahu is fighting for his political survival – and in that battle, no bridge is too far.
While Israel initially focussed its attacks on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile bases, the conflict has escalated to include targets that could draw the US into the war (such as energy facilities and residential buildings), and it is just getting started.
In line with his grand Churchillian ambition – and mirroring the perspective he has brought to his war against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon – Netanyahu is seeking “total victory” over Iran. This would render a nuclear deal unnecessary.
There is just one problem: Israel is incapable of eradicating Iran’s nuclear programme. Israel has struck nuclear sites in Natanz and Isfahan, but the damage to the facilities was limited, partly because Israel recognised the need to avoid unleashing radiation across the region. And Israel does not have bombs that can penetrate Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is built inside a mountain.
Of course, physical infrastructure is only part of the equation. That is why Israel also targeted scientists, as well as top Revolutionary Guard leaders. But Iran’s nuclear programme is an expansive and deeply embedded state project. Killing a few – or even a few dozen – individuals will not paralyse it, let alone eliminate it.
In any case, Israel still needs the US. And Trump has no interest in letting Israel drive up oil prices or create a rift between him and America’s Gulf allies, which just agreed to funnel trillions of dollars in investment towards the US.
Nor can Israel hope for the tacit complicity that the Arab states demonstrated in its war against Hamas and Hezbollah. While these countries have no love for Iran, they have a vested interest in regional stability, especially as they work to diversify their economies.
A cornered Iran might even attack the Gulf states directly, hitting their oil installations or disrupting transport lanes in the Persian Gulf. These countries want a nuclear deal, not a regional conflagration.
Iran probably wants roughly the same. Though it withdrew from scheduled nuclear talks in Oman, its military response has been confined to Israeli targets.
Notably, despite having poured billions of dollars into its regional proxies in recent years, it has refrained from activating them – however diminished they may have been rendered by Israel – against American or Arab targets.
But if Iran finds itself with its back against the wall, it can force a reluctant Hezbollah and its Iraqi militias into the fight. If not now, when? It is for occasions like this that the alliances were created in the first place.
Iran can also incite attacks against Israel elsewhere, such as the West Bank. Moreover, it will probably withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, opening the way for it to achieve nuclear breakout – a process that would take mere months.
Iran now risks falling into the same strategic trap that drained the energies of the Sunni pan-Arabism it revolted against in 1979. By pouring its energy and resources into a war of annihilation against Israel, it would jeopardise its primary objective: regime survival.
But Iran is not alone in letting illusory ambitions cloud its judgment. If Israel cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear programme, it certainly cannot achieve total victory over Iran’s regime. And it is not just Iran: none of Israel’s security challenges can be overcome through total victory.
No matter how many bombs Netanyahu drops, diplomacy will remain the only answer. Meanwhile, Israel’s military hubris is becoming inadmissible to its moderate Arab allies. They wanted Israel as an equal partner in a regional peace, not as a new hegemon.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, is vice-president of the Toledo International Center for Peace.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.
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