Write an article about What the Cambodia-Thailand conflict teaches us about power without war .Organize the content with appropriate headings and subheadings (h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6), Retain any existing tags from
From Samirul Ariff Othman
The recent border tensions between Cambodia and Thailand illustrate how conflicts, if managed properly, can be prevented from spiralling into prolonged instability.
Unlike previous episodes around the Preah Vihear temple area—particularly the 2008–2011 skirmishes—this latest flare-up was contained swiftly and decisively. The crisis reached a moderate stage of escalation but never crossed into open confrontation. This was not accidental. It was deliberate.
A conflict contained, not ignited
Applying Glasl’s Conflict Escalation Model, the conflict rose to stage three, where positions hardened and military posturing began. However, it was pulled back before entering stage five, which typically involves loss of face, threats, or coercion.
In short, it stopped at a “win–lose” threshold and did not degenerate into “lose–lose” territory. This is rare in regional disputes with historical baggage. The fact that it de-escalated so quickly requires explanation.
Two external actors played pivotal but contrasting roles—Malaysia and the US.
Malaysia acted in line with its Asean obligations, engaging in quiet diplomacy without fanfare. It avoided megaphone tactics and operated through trust networks built over decades.
Malaysia has long branded itself as a neutral and moderate regional actor. That branding paid off. Cambodian and Thai officials responded to backchannel efforts initiated discreetly. Soft power is not declared, it is earned.
In parallel, the US signalled strategic boundaries. The US Indo-Pacific Command continued joint exercises with Thailand and released indirect warnings against further escalation. This hard power deterrence complemented Malaysia’s soft approach.
Neither actor tried to dominate the process, but together they created a smart power framework that worked.
Smart power, as conceptualised by American political scientist Joseph Nye, is the ability to combine attraction with coercion. The Cambodia–Thailand episode is a textbook example. Soft power opened the door. Hard power closed the door on conflict. The combination was effective because it was not overplayed. This is a lesson in proportionality.
Economically, both countries had every reason to avoid war. Thailand depends on cross-border trade and labour flows. Cambodia remains sensitive to external economic pressure, especially after losing partial access to the EU’s Everything but Arms (EBA) privileges.
Both governments are also managing fragile post-Covid recoveries. Neither can afford to scare off investors or tourists. These are not abstract concerns, they carry real costs factored into national decision-making.
What Asean got right this time
Asean’s framework—often criticised for being slow or consensus-bound—proved its worth here.
There was no need for a formal summit. Informal ties, long standing protocols, and cultural sensitivity achieved what many “rules-based” systems struggle to deliver: quick, face-saving de-escalation. This is regional diplomacy as it should be— pragmatic, not performative.
Comparatively, this conflict bears similarity to Turkey’s strategy in the Middle East. Turkey projects influence through cultural ties, humanitarian networks, and economic leverage—while retaining the capacity for hard response.
Malaysia is not Turkey, but in Asean it plays a similar role: a broker that speaks softly and acts through relational power, not military muscle.
Critically, the conflict did not descend into identity-based or ideological dimensions. There were no attempts to weaponise religion, ethnicity, or nationalism. Media narratives remained controlled. Social media mobilisation was limited. This prevented escalation into an emotionally charged standoff. Policymakers on both sides behaved rationally, and their restraint must be acknowledged.
What does this episode tell us?
First, conflict management in Aseans still works, when countries want it to.
Second, soft power is not about being weak; it is about being trusted.
Third, the strategic pairing of soft and hard power, applied with timing and discipline, is more effective than relying on either in isolation.
Lastly, this case demonstrates that values, culture and diplomacy still matter in Asia. Power in this region is not exercised through megaphones or military parades—it is exercised through calibrated words, strategic restraint and behind-the-scenes persuasion.
This is how conflicts should end. Quietly, quickly, and with minimal collateral.
Samirul Ariff Othman is an adjunct lecturer at Universiti Teknologi Petronas, an international relations analyst and a senior consultant with Global Asia Consulting.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect that of FMT.
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